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ABSTRACT
Objective
To investigate the determinants and quality of coverage decisions among uninsured
choosing plans in a hypothetical health insurance marketplace.
Study setting
Two samples of uninsured individuals: one from an internet-based sample comprised
largely of young, healthy, tech-savvy individuals (n=276), and the other from low-income, rural
Virginians (n=161).
Study design
We assessed whether health insurance comprehension, numeracy, choice consistency,
and the number of plan choices, were associated with participants’ ability to choose a cost
minimizing plan given their expected health care needs (defined as choosing a plan costing no
more than $500 in excess of the total estimated annual costs of the cheapest plan available).
Data collection
Primary data were collected using an online questionnaire.
Principal findings
Uninsured who were more numerate showed higher health insurance comprehension;
those with more health insurance comprehension made choices of health insurance plans more
consistent with their stated preferences; and those who made choices more concordant with their
stated preferences were less likely to choose a plan that cost more than $500 in excess of the
cheapest plan available.
Conclusions
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Increasing health insurance comprehension and designing exchanges to facilitate plan
comparison will be critical to ensuring the success of health insurance marketplaces.

Key words: Affordable Care Act; health insurance exchanges/marketplaces; insurance choice,
numeracy, health insurance comprehension; uninsured
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INTRODUCTION
With the implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and its mandate requiring
health care coverage, millions of Americans have started shopping for health insurance – and are
doing so in a new way. Those who do not have employer-based or government-sponsored
insurance will purchase coverage through online exchanges, which, depending on state of
residence, will be administered by the federal government or the state.
While this presents an opportunity for millions of uninsured, there are enormous
challenges facing both those running the exchanges and those who must use them. Outreach is a
significant challenge, especially because most of the uninsured had very little understanding of
their responsibility to purchase coverage just a few months before the exchanges opened. In
April 2013, three years after the law was passed and just a few months before the
commencement of enrollment, more than half of young people and almost 60% of the uninsured
did not even know the law was still in effect, much less details about their responsibilities
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2013).
Moreover, even after an eligible person is successfully reached and understands the need
to obtain coverage, he or she must make a decision on which plan to purchase from what
company, which may have significant economic and health-related consequences. Previous
research from the market for Medicare prescription drug coverage has shown that individuals
find it difficult to navigate multiple choices and the accompanying information. As a result, they
often spend more money than they need to and rarely switch to a more appropriate plan later on
(Abaluck and Gruber; 2013; Zhou and Zhang, 2012). Providing information that is necessary –
but not so much that it causes more confusion – is the major challenge facing those building such
information systems.
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The exchanges present a daunting challenge because of the people who need to use them.
The uninsured differ from other population groups in several ways. While younger (and thus
more likely to be facile at using online materials), they are less likely to be married, have lower
income and education levels, and are more likely to be minorities and immigrants (O’Neill and
O’Neill, 2009). Younger individuals, moreover, tend to be more risk-taking and impulsive
(Steinberg et al., 2008).
In this article, compare two samples of uninsured individuals that we constructed,
surveyed, and tested: one from an internet-based sample comprised largely of young, healthy,
tech-savvy individuals, and the other of low-income, rural Virginians. We conduct a computerbased experiment using a hypothetical exchange like the one the uninsured will face in the
marketplace, and examine the quality of the decisions they make in choosing health insurance.
Of particular interest are the determinants of the quality of choices made. Going forward, these
results can be used by federal and state officials and the research community in devising more
effective health insurance marketplaces.

PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES
The section is subdivided into three determinants of the quality of insurance choices that
are represented in a conceptual model in Appendix 1 and examined empirically below: health
insurance comprehension, amount of choice, and numerical ability or numeracy. For the
purposes of our study, insurance choice quality is defined as whether or not consumers choose a
plan that aligns with their stated preferences and, ultimately, whether they choose a cost
minimizing plan given their expected health care needs.

Health Insurance Comprehension
6

Health insurance comprehension has been defined as “the degree to which individuals
have the knowledge, ability, and confidence to find and evaluate information about health plans,
select the best plan for their own (or their family’s) financial and health circumstances, and use
the plan once enrolled” (Consumers Union, 2011). It can be thought of as a decision-making
ability, rather than a trait per se, reflecting consumers’ understanding of health insurance
information. Therefore, it is likely influenced by cognitive abilities consumers’ possess (e.g.
numeracy) and the amount of information available in the decision environment.
While it may be a critical ability for consumers choosing in health insurance
marketplaces, we know little about whether and how health insurance comprehension is related
to insurance choices. The few studies to date on health insurance comprehension have focused
on enrollees’ comprehension of private insurance (e.g. Loewenstein et al., 2013) and specific
aspects of public insurance programs (e.g. Medicare; Greenwald et al. 2006; McCormack et al.,
2009) and the enrollee characteristics correlated with this comprehension. These studies find
that insured Americans have difficulty understanding traditional health insurance plans because
they are too complicated (Loewenstein et al., 2013). Although there has been scant evidence on
health insurance comprehension and coverage choices (see Kim et al., 2013 for a review),
findings from the finance literature suggests consumers with higher financial comprehension are
more likely to rely on objective planning measures (e.g. financial calculators, experts, education)
and are more successful in retirement and investment planning (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011).
Therefore, we hypothesize that uninsured consumers with higher health insurance
comprehension will make better coverage decisions insofar as they will be more likely to choose
a cost minimizing plan given their expected health care needs (Hypothesis 1).
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Amount of choice
Choice size has been identified as an important factor affecting consumers’ health
insurance decisions. The Medicare Prescription Drug Program (Part D) provides the best
evidence to date on how individuals deal with health insurance choice. In a series of
experiments, both younger and older participants more easily identified the cheapest insurance
plan available when there were fewer choices (Barnes et al., 2012; Hanoch et al., 2009 and
2011). This result is consistent with Herbert Simon’s (1955) theory of bounded rationality and
implies consumers facing information-rich environments often make suboptimal choices due to
cognitive overload.
Several studies have also been conducted using “real world” data from the Medicare drug
program. Using data from the first four years of the program, Abaluck and Gruber (2013) found
that 20% of beneficiaries were choosing the plan that minimized total costs (premiums plus outof-pocket expenses) in 2006, the first year of the program, and that over the next three years,
even fewer did due to inertia. Zhou and Zhang (2012) demonstrated that only five percent of
beneficiaries successfully chose the lowest cost plan in 2009, with the typical person spending
over $350 more than they had to during the year. From this evidence base we generate several
hypotheses. First, health insurance comprehension should be negatively influenced by the
amount of information in the decision environment. That is, having more plan options, and
hence a more cognitively demanding decision environment, will be associated with lower health
insurance comprehension scores (Hypothesis 2). Second, as the number of insurance choices
increases, consumers will have more difficulty choosing a cost minimizing plan given their
expected health care needs (Hypothesis 3). We further hypothesize that, to the extent that more
plan options in the choice set adversely affects the quality of coverage choices, the cognitive
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overload effect of having more information in the decision environment will be mediated by
health insurance comprehension (Hypothesis 4).

Numeracy
Numeracy—or the ability to understand, use and manipulate numbers—has received
much attention from researchers, as it has been shown to play a vital role within the health
domain. Researchers have also shown that numeracy is an independent factor, distinct from
education and intelligence, that influences medical (Reyna et al., 2009) and health insurance
decision-making (Wood et al., 2011). For example, Wood et al. (2011; see also Hanoch et al.,
2009; Hanoch et al., 2011) have identified numeracy as a key determinant of both younger and
older adults’ ability to choose the cheapest Medicare part D plan, and Szrek and Bundorf (2011)
reported that high levels of numeracy are directly associated with the likelihood of enrolling in
the Medicare Part D program. We hypothesize that more numerate consumers will be more
likely to choose a cost minimizing plan (Hypothesis 5).
With regard to health insurance comprehension, Hibbard and colleagues (1998) have
demonstrated that numeracy is strongly related to the capability to comprehend and evaluate
health insurance plans. In another study, Hibbard and colleagues (2007) found that numeracy is
the best predictor for evaluating participants’ comprehension levels and capacity to correctly
answer questions about measures of hospital quality, costs, and identifying the best hospital from
a given list. We therefore predict that consumers with higher numeric ability will have higher
health insurance comprehension (Hypothesis 6).

DATA AND METHODS
Participants
9

Data were collected from two sources: a rural sample of uninsured and an online sample
of uninsured.
Rural sample of uninsured
A community sample of uninsured individuals residing in the rural southern and
southwestern counties of Virginia was recruited using several media outlets including flyers
posted in libraries and clinics, public service announcements aired on the radio, television, and
community websites, and through community recruiters. Adults who self-identified as uninsured
and were under age 65 were enrolled in the study and asked to complete an online survey.
Typically, these surveys were conducted on computers at the local public libraries. Participants
were compensated $25 for their time and the study was approved by the institutional review
board of the university managing the study. In total, 201 uninsured rural individuals composed
the first segment of our participants.
Online sample of uninsured
To collect data from an online sample of uninsured, a single question Human Intelligence
Task (HIT) was published on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Paolacci et al., 2010) asking
participants whether they were “covered by health insurance or some other kind of health care
plan.” All respondents (N=1,771) were compensated $0.25 for answering the eligibility
question. Those who self-reported they were uninsured were offered $1.00 to answer the survey
(N=309).
Responses from the online and rural sample were then combined into a single data set
comprised of 510 responses. Twenty were dropped from the survey because they responded that
they were insured. Another 53 observations were not included in the regression analysis due to
missing data resulting in a final analytic sample of 437 participants.
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Survey
The survey consisted of seven sections: 1) demographics, 2) health status, 3) health
services utilization, 4) insurance choice task, 5) numeracy, 6) patient activation, and 7) risk and
time preferences (Appendix 2).
Insurance Choice Variables
Eighty-eight single coverage plan quotes were obtained in the summer of 2012 for a
hypothetical 35 year old male nonsmoker residing in Virginia from eHealthInsurance.com.
eHealthInsurance.com has recently contracted with the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) and is expected to enroll millions of Americans in federally-run health
insurance marketplaces (Mangan, 2013). Plan quotes from common sellers in the non-group
market in Virginia (e.g., Anthem, Aetna, and United) were used to create nine exchange plans
across three tiers - three bronze, three silver, and three gold - that varied on cost and coverage.
Participants were asked to read the following prompt:
Think about your health in this past year including how many times you saw your doctor,
went to the emergency room, or stayed in the hospital. Also consider your current
income. Imagine your health remains exactly the same this year as last year. Which
health insurance plan do you think will best meet your individual needs this year?

Then, participants were presented with 3 or 9 insurance plans in random order. Each plan
choice included information on ten attributes (e.g. copay, annual deductible). In the three plan
condition, one plan from each tier (bronze, silver, and gold) was presented to participants. In the
nine plan condition, two additional options were included in each tier (Figure 1). All participants
chose a plan in both conditions.
Chose a more costly plan given expected health care needs
11

Using participants’ self-reported health care utilization over the past 12 months as a
proxy for expected health care needs, we estimated whether participants chose an insurance plan
that minimized their total expected annual costs (i.e. premium plus out-of-pocket expenses).
Utilization questions were adapted from the 2009 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS)
Household Component survey (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2012). Costs of
self-reported health care use were approximated using median expenditures for each service in
the 2009 MEPS (Appendix 3).
From these data, total annual costs for each plan option were constructed for each
individual that included premiums and, if services were used, copays for each service and out-ofpocket costs. For service utilizations that included a range (e.g., 2-3 doctors’ visits), the
minimum was used. Total annual costs for plans chosen averaged $2,434 (range $864-$15,924).
Differences in total costs between the plan chosen and each alternative were calculated, and
averaged $597 (range $0- $11,620). A binary variable was constructed to indicate whether
individuals chose a plan that was at least $500 more in total annual costs than the lowest cost
plan given their expected health care needs. On average, a $500 cost difference represented
approximately 20% of total expenditures.
Choice consistency
Respondents were also asked which three of the ten plan attributes were most important
in their decisions. To measure the extent to which participants’ stated and revealed preferences
aligned, we defined choice consistency as whether the attributes that participants indicated were
most important (stated preference) matched with whether these attributes were minimized (or
maximized) in their plan choice (revealed preference). For example, if a participant indicated
premiums were most important in their plan choice, did they choose a plan with the lowest
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premium? Since few (3%) respondents were able to align all three preferences, consistent
responses on two and three preference categories were combined. Thus, choice consistency was
defined as 0, 1, 2 (or 3).
Health insurance comprehension
Four health insurance comprehension questions were asked, including: 1) whether the
plan chosen had a lower out-of-pocket max than other available plans, 2) whether the chosen
plan had a lower annual deductible than other available plans, 3) which plan would be the lowest
cost plan if no health services were needed in a year, and 4) which plan would be the lowest cost
plan if $10,000 in health services were needed in a year. Health insurance comprehension scores
were the sum of correct responses.
Covariates of interest
Number of plan options
A binary variable was created indicating whether participants were choosing in the 3 or 9
plan condition.
Numeracy
Numeracy was assessed using four items consisting of basic probability calculations from
the Lipkus scale (Lipkus, Samsa, and Rimer, 2001).
Control variables
The adjusted analyses also controlled for participants’ patient activation scores (Hibbard
et al., 2005), risk preferences (DOSPERT; Blais and Weber, 2006), discount rates (Khwaja,
Silverman, and Sloan, 2007), age, gender, race/ethnicity, education, marital status, income
(below federal poverty level), in the online or rural sample, health status (SF-12 V2; Ware et al.,
1995), presence of any chronic conditions, and, in health insurance comprehension and choice

13

consistency regressions, whether participants were “high utilizers” of health services (i.e., had
more than one emergency department or inpatient admission in the past year) (Appendix 4).
Statistical Analyses
Descriptive statistics are presented for each study sample and for the overall sample. Ttests and Chi-square tests were used to determine whether any unadjusted differences exist in the
means or frequencies of the variables between the two study samples. In the adjusted models,
generalized estimating equations were fit assuming a Poisson distribution for health insurance
comprehension and choice consistency whereas a binomial distribution was assumed for choice
of a more costly plan. Adjusted results are reported as count ratios (CR) in the health insurance
comprehension and choice consistency models and as odd ratios (OR) for the model of whether
participants chose a cost minimizing plan. In all regression models, robust standard errors are
used to correct variance estimates for clustering. Formal mediation analyses were conducted by
estimating the indirect effect (i.e. the coefficient for the association between X and Y when
mediator M is absent minus the coefficient for the association between X and Y when M is
present (MacKinnon and Dwyer, 1993)). Percentile method confidence intervals for indirect
effects were obtained via bootstrapping using 10,000 replicates (Bollen and Stine, 1990;
Lockwood and MacKinnon, 1998, Hayes and Scharkow, 2013). All analyses were conducted in
Stata 12 (StataCorp., 2011).

RESULTS
Sample Characteristics
Of the 437 uninsured participants comprising our analytic sample, 276 (63.2%) were
from the online sample and the remainder from the rural sample (Table 1). Among all
respondents, 40% chose a health plan costing at least $500 more than an available alternative
14

given their expected health care needs. In our sample, participants had difficulty choosing plans
that aligned with their stated preferences (consistency score 1.17, SD 0.78) and could correctly
answer around two of the four health insurance comprehension questions (mean 2.61, SD 1.19)
as well as two of the four numeracy questions (mean 2.15, SD 1.37).
Unadjusted Associations of Choosing a More Costly Plan
Before adjustment, there was no significant difference in the probability of choosing a
plan that was at least $500 more expensive than the cheapest alternative when participants chose
from three (37.4%) or nine plans (42.9%) (p=0.11). The average cost difference between the plan
chosen and the cheapest alternative was $537 in the three plan condition and $656 in the 9 plan
condition. The probability of choosing a more costly plan significantly decreased as consistency
score increased (p<0.01). The difference in excess costs for participants with a choice
consistency score of two or higher was $529 vs. $656 for participants with a consistency score of
zero. The likelihood of choosing a more costly plan decreased significantly as insurance
comprehension increased (p<0.01) with participants scoring perfectly on comprehension having
$360 in average excess costs and those scoring zero having a difference of $1,109.
Adjusted Associations of Choosing a More Costly Plan, Choice Consistency and Health
Insurance Comprehension
Chose a more costly plan given expected health care needs
After adjustment, we found evidence supporting hypothesis 1 that health insurance
comprehension was negatively associated with the odds of choosing a plan that was at least $500
more expensive in total estimated annual costs (OR 0.84, p<0.05, Table 2).1 We also found
support for a positive relationship between the number of plans and consumers’ choice of a more
costly plan (OR 1.31, p<0.05; hypothesis 3) before controlling for health insurance
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comprehension. However, after controlling for comprehension, the effect of more plan choice
decreased in magnitude and was not significant. Our mediation test indicated the effect of more
plan options on choosing a more costly plan may operate indirectly through health insurance
comprehension (OR 1.10, p<0.05; hypothesis 4). However, we found no evidence to support
hypothesis 5 that higher levels of numeracy were associated with a decreased likelihood of
choosing a more costly plan.
Increased choice consistency was associated with lower odds of choosing a more costly
plan (OR 0.42, p<0.01). With choice consistency in the model, the health insurance
comprehension and 9 plan choice coefficients were no longer significant. Formal mediation tests
indicate the effect of health insurance comprehension on choosing a more costly plan was
indirect via choice consistency (OR 0.90, p<0.01). We also found weak evidence that the effect
increased plan choice on making a more costly coverage choice was mediated by choice
consistency (OR 1.11, p<0.10), presumably via health insurance comprehension.
Choice consistency
Higher health insurance comprehension scores were significantly associated with the
consistency between stated and revealed preferences in participants’ plan choices (CR 1.13,
p<0.01, Table 3), providing support for hypothesis 1. In addition, we found evidence in support
of hypothesis 3 of an inverse relationship between number of plan options and choice
consistency (CR 0.93, p<0.05). We also found support for hypothesis 4 that the effect of the
number of plan options on consistency was mediated by health insurance comprehension (CR
1.08, p<0.01).
Health insurance comprehension
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We found support for the second hypothesis that increasing the number of insurance plan
options was associated with lower health insurance comprehension scores (CR 0.79, p<0.01,
Table 4). Supporting hypothesis 6, higher levels of numeracy were also significantly associated
with higher health insurance comprehension scores (CR 1.09, p<0.01).
Sensitivity tests
We tested the sensitivity of our main results to empirical definitions of choosing a cost
minimizing plan (i.e., dichotomous vs. linear cost difference) and choice consistency, missing
data, interactions between the sample indicator and regressors of interest, collinearity, and
preferences for plan quality. These are presented in Appendix 5. Broadly, the main results are
robust to the alternative model specifications examined.

DISCUSSION
Our study is among the first to explore how uninsured populations are expected to
perform in health insurance exchanges. In line with earlier work on Medicare part D (Hanoch et
al., 2009; Abaluck and Gruber, 2011), the findings revealed that many consumers did not choose
a cost minimizing plan. Furthermore, the younger, more tech savvy uninsured in the online
sample, and poorer, more rural uninsured both performed poorly in the coverage decision tasks.
Participants in the sample, furthermore, had difficulty choosing plans that aligned with their
stated preferences (choice consistency), correctly answering factual questions about health
insurance choices (health insurance comprehension) and calculating simple probabilities
(numeracy).
These results are not isolated ones. Others have also found that even insured individuals
face serious obstacles in answering questions about health insurance (Lowenstein et al., 2013).
An investigation by Finucane and colleagues (2005) revealed that young and old participants
17

have difficulties answering simple questions about health insurance information, such as being
able to identify the lowest copayment for an office visit from a grid that included only four
different plans. Earlier examinations (Marquis, 1983), likewise, have shown that even families
who possess health insurance are unable to respond correctly to questions about their own health
care coverage.
Five of our six hypotheses were supported by our data analysis. The results are
consistent with the idea that consumers’ decision-making abilities, in conjunction with the
amount of information in their choice environment, affect the quality of the health insurance
choices they make. Two important factors at play in coverage choices are numeracy and health
insurance comprehension, and they were statistically significant in the regression analyses.
Those who were more numerate showed higher health insurance comprehension; those with
more health insurance comprehension made choices of health insurance plans more consistent
with their stated preferences; and those who made choices more concordant with their stated
preference were less likely to choose a plan that cost more than $500 in excess of the cheapest
plan available. The amount of information in the decision environment was also important.
Participants facing more plan choices showed lower health insurance comprehension. Further,
the results suggest that cognitive overload from too much information in the decision
environment operates on choice quality via insurance comprehension.
These findings augment and extend earlier work focusing on Medicare and Medicare Part
D. Studies by Hibbard and colleagues (2001) looking at health insurance within Medicare and
Hanoch et al. (2009, 2011; Wood et al, 2011), focusing on Medicare Part D, found that
individuals encounter difficulties in making health insurance decisions. Indeed, in Hanoch et al.
(2009) and Wood et al. (2011), individuals who faced a greater array of prescription drug options
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made worse decisions, findings that were later supported by examining real world data (Abaluck
and Gruber, 2013). Finally, the results further highlight the importance of numeracy within the
medical arena, and especially with regard to understanding insurance. Peters et al., (2007), as
well as Szrek and Bundorf (2011; 2013), also found that more numerate individuals make better
insurance related decisions.

LIMITATIONS
Although our data and design have many strengths, several limitations suggest caution
should be taken when interpreting our results. Neither the rural nor online sample was
representative of uninsured in rural regions of the U.S. or of the entire U.S. population of
uninsured. By design, they represent two very different populations who will be enrolling in
health insurance marketplaces: younger, healthier, more tech-savvy uninsured and less healthy,
rural uninsured who may be less facile with computer technology. The results may also limited
by the lack of incentive-compatibility in the choice experiments. Participant compensation was
not aligned with performance and so, without “skin in the game”, various factors, including selfserving biases, inattention, and strategic motives could cause them to misreport their true
preferences, limiting the generalizability of the findings to real-world decision-making (see
Camerer and Hogarth, 1999 for a discussion).
Using cost minimization as the choice objective may limit the scope of the findings as
well. For example, no particular coverage choice is necessarily a bad choice in the real-world
due to differences in provider networks across plan offerings. Furthermore, plans with the same
expected costs may have different risk properties, such as the risk of higher maximum out-ofpocket costs. However, earlier evidence suggests that cost is one of the most salient and
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important factors in coverage choices (Mechanic, 1989; MedPAC, 2006) and so we empirically
defined our insurance choice outcomes in the experiments to delineate between clear winners
and losers based on costs. In doing so, two sources of measurement error arise from our
empirical treatment of the excess cost outcome. The data do not allow the use of the actual costs
participants faced and, even if they did, participants may not accurately recall their utilization
history. Furthermore, the consistency of the estimates in each of the models may be affected by
omitted variables bias. For example, past experiences with health insurance plan choices (e.g.,
through a previous job) are not controlled for. If such experiences are strongly and positively
correlated with health insurance comprehension and choosing a cost minimizing plan, then we
would expect the insurance comprehension estimate to be biased away from zero.

CONCLUSIONS
The Congressional Budget Office estimates 26 million Americans will be covered in
exchanges by 2020 (Congressional Budget Office, 2013). Our results are among the first to
demonstrate that numeracy and health insurance comprehension will be critical skills in choosing
a health insurance plan that offers consumers adequate risk protection given their expected health
care needs and therefore critical to the successful implementation of the Affordable Care Act.
Further, the relationship between these decision-making skills and the quality of coverage
choices was consistent across a spectrum of uninsured individuals differing in age, income, and
education. Indeed, these findings raise serious concern about consumers’ ability to navigate
through the exchanges, as well as compare and choose health insurance plans. Recently, Peters,
Meilleur, and Tompkins (2013) reported that nearly 30% of uninsured adults had a below basic
level of numeracy. The findings regarding fewer plan choices are consistent with much of the
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literature that was reviewed earlier in the article. At the time of writing, the number of choices is
not clear and will vary by state, but at a minimum, individuals will have to choose
comprehensiveness of coverage (e.g., gold, silver, or bronze plans) as well as particular
companies within the tier they select.
Admittedly, in the short run it will be exceedingly difficult to improve the population’s
numeracy and health insurance comprehension. Nevertheless, other strategies, which focus on
enhancing insurance choices outside of educating decision-makers, are possible. One example is
for the federal and state governments to support a vibrant network of insurance
navigators. These experts will fill vital roles by assisting consumers in understanding health
insurance and comparing plan options. Second, the marketplaces themselves can be designed to
make plan comparisons more salient rather than rely on consumers to be more informed and
engaged in their decision-making (Nease et al., 2013). For example, to reduce reliance on
numeracy in insurance choices, recent work has found using symbols rather than numbers
improves plan choices in Medicare Part D (Barnes et al., 2013). Further, some state-run
exchanges (e.g. California, Massachusetts) are standardizing coverage options within a metal tier
to improve comparability of plan offerings. These purposeful designs to the choice environment
will likely assist consumers in their decision-making and other efforts towards choice
architecture in exchanges should be explored.
Speaking about the Affordable Care Act, former U.S. President Bill Clinton stated that
“the health of our people, the security and stability of our families, and the strength of our
economy are all riding on getting health care reform right and doing it well.” He also noted that
he was “still amazed at how much misunderstanding there is about the current system of health
care” (Goodnough and Chosick, 2013). Indeed, awareness of these marketplaces among those
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expected to enroll in them is low and many who are aware of them fear they will be too
complicated (Commonwealth Fund, 2013). The health insurance choices made in exchanges in
the coming years will have major financial and health ramifications for consumers, for the
broader health care system and, ultimately, for the success of the most sweeping health reform
since the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid. Whether the policy goals of the Affordable Care
Act are achieved will be shaped in no small part by the extent Americans become engaged
consumers of health insurance. To do so, our findings suggest they will need a great deal of help
understanding and comparing coverage options when making these important decisions.
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ENDNOTES

1. Excess health plan costs given expected health care needs may arise from over- or
underinsurance (i.e., choosing too much coverage if healthy or too little if sick). Both sources of
decision error should be affected health insurance comprehension. To test whether this was the
case, we first created rough indicators for over- and underinsurance. Recall that the variable
“high-utilizer” is defined as having more than one emergency department visit and/or any
hospital stay in the past year. Underinsurance was defined being a high utilizer and choosing a
“Bronze” plan. Overinsurance was defined as choosing a “Silver” or “Gold” plan but not being a
“high-utilizer.” We then tested for differences in health insurance comprehension across these
groups. We found that participants who were over- or underinsured had significantly lower
unadjusted insurance comprehension than those who were “adequately” insured. Specifically,
those who were adequately insured had comprehension scores of 2.69 vs. 2.45 for those who
were over-insured (p<0.01). Likewise, those who were adequately insured had comprehension
scores that were 2.65 vs. 1.96 for those who were underinsured (p<0.01).
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Figure 1. Three and nine plan choice condition
Plan Name
Plan Level
Monthly premium cost
Annual deductible
Annual Out-of-Pocket max
(includes deductible)
Doctor visit copay
Generic prescription drug copay
Emergency room copay
Hospitals copay
Insurance plan quality rating
Total you pay to manage your
diabetes
Total you pay to give birth in a
hospital

A*
Bronze
$72
$5,000
$10,000

B
Bronze
$73
$10,000
$10,000

C
Bronze
$77
$10,000
$15,000

D*
Silver
$115
$750
$4,250

E
Silver
$117
$2,000
$5,000

$20
$20
40% after
deductible
40% after
deductible
4.1 out of
5
$4,100

$35
$15
0% after
deductible
0% after
deductible
4.0 out of
5
$4,100

$5,992

$7,450

F
Silver
$121
$1,250
$5,500

G*
Gold
$192
$500
$2,000

H
Gold
$195
$0
$3,000

$35
$15
30% after
deductible
30% after
deductible
3.5 out of
5
$4,100

$35
$15
30% after
deductible
30% after
deductible
4.2 out of
5
$1,821

$20
$20
25% after
deductible
25% after
deductible
4.0 out of
5
$2,450

$7,450

$2,770

$3,378

I
Gold
$203
$1,000
$2,500

$25
$15
30% after
deductible
30% after
deductible
3.9 out of
5
$2,116

$30
$15
20% after
deductible
20% after
deductible
4.2 out of
5
$1,292

$25
$15
35% after
deductible
35% after
deductible
4.1 out of
5
$1,445

$25
$15
20% after
deductible
20% after
deductible
3.8 out of
5
$1,632

$3,121

$1,902

$2,617

$2,302

Notes: Plans with (*) were included in the three plan condition. Plan attributes were based on DHHS guidelines and definitions of terms from the DHHS
Glossary of Health Coverage and Medical Terms were provided to all participants (Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight, 2012). All plan
comparison information was provided to individuals throughout the study to minimize working memory load (Wood et al., 2011) and letters of the alphabet were
used instead of plan names to minimize brand effects (Barnes et al., 2012).
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Table 1 Sample Characteristics

Outcomes

Regressors
of interest

Chose plan costing at least $500 more than the
lowest cost plan
Choice consistency (range 0-2)
(SD)
Health insurance comprehension (range 0-4)
(SD)
9 plan condition

Overall
(n=437)
40%

Online
(n=276)
34%

Rural
(n=161)
52%*

1.17
(0.78)
2.61
(1.19)

1.20
(0.77)
2.97
(1.06)

1.13
(0.79)
1.99*
(1.15)

50%
2.15
(1.37)
79.80
(10.23)
36%

50%
2.76
(1.18)
78.90
(10.00)
48%

50%NA
1.10*
(0.96)
81.27*
(10.18)
19%*

Numeracy (range 0-4)
(SD)
Covariates Patient activation (range 0-100)
(SD)
Missing patient activation
DOSPERT (range 1-7)
Health risk
2.76
2.94
2.44*
(SD)
(1.06)
(1.04)
(1.01)
Financial investment
3.19
3.24
3.10
(SD)
(1.52)
(1.39)
(1.73)
Financial risk
1.62
1.66
1.55
(SD)
(1.09)
(1.12)
(1.03)
Time discounting
2.11
2.13
2.09
(range 0-4)
(1.45)
(1.45)
(1.42)
Age
33.52
29.60
40.31*
(SD)
(11.72)
(8.96)
(12.80)
Male
54%
65%
34%*
Non-Hispanic White
60%
82%
22%*
Non-Hispanic African American (NHAA)
30%
4%
75%*
Other ethnicity
10%
14%
3%*
High school or less
36%
21%
56%*
Some college
38%
42%
31%*
College or more
28%
37%
13%*
Currently employed
57%
61%
51%*
Federal poverty level (FPL)
36%
24%
57%*
Rural sample
37%
0%
100%NA
Fair or poor health
24%
21%
28%*
Any chronic disease
42%
34%
54%*
High utilizer
14%
6%
28%*
Note: * indicates bivariate test (t-test or Chi-square) of differences between online and rural
sample characteristics significant at p<0.05.
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Table 2 Correlates of Choice of a Plan at Least $500 more than the Lowest Cost Plan Given
Expected Health Care Needs1
Odds Ratio
Odds Ratio
Odds Ratio
(SE)
(SE)
(SE)
Regressors of
Choice consistency
--0.42***
interest
(0.05)
Health insurance
0.84**
0.94
comprehension
-(0.06)
(0.07)
9 plan condition
1.31**
1.19
1.18
(0.16)
(0.16)
(0.17)
Numeracy
0.96
0.99
0.99
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.09)
Covariates
Patient activation
1.00
1.00
1.00
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
Missing patient
0.52**
0.54***
0.60**
activation
(0.10)
(0.11)
(0.11)
Health risk
0.83**
0.84*
0.86
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.08)
Financial investment
1.08
1.09
1.06
(0.07)
(0.07)
(0.07)
Financial risk
1.17*
1.16*
1.15*
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.09)
Time discounting
1.05
1.06
1.04
(0.06)
(0.06)
(0.06)
Age
1.01
1.01
1.00
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
Male
1.04
1.03
0.92
(0.21)
(0.21)
(0.18)
NHAA
1.06
1.00
1.18
(0.29)
(0.27)
(0.34)
Other race
0.73
0.71
0.80
(0.22)
(0.20)
(0.21)
Some college
0.65**
0.65**
0.57**
(0.13)
(0.13)
(0.12)
College or more
1.06
1.03
0.82
(0.27)
(0.26)
(0.22)
Employed
1.11
1.11
0.98
(0.19)
(0.19)
(0.18)
FPL
1.33
1.33
1.30
(0.25)
(0.25)
(0.26)
Rural
1.16
1.09
1.05
(0.34)
(0.32)
(0.31)
Fair or poor health
1.04
1.04
0.83
(0.24)
(0.24)
(0.19)
Any chronic disease
1.23
1.24
1.43*
(0.25)
(0.25)
(0.29)
31

Constant
Indirect effects4
(mediation)

0.67
(0.62)

9 plans

----

0.91
(0.86)
1.10**
(0.05)
----

852

852

2.30
(2.33)
1.10*
(0.07)
0.90***
(0.03)
848

437

437

437

----

Health insurance
comprehension
Observations
Number of
individuals

1Correlates of choosing a more costly plan modeled using GEE assuming a binomial distribution
for the outcomes. Robust standard errors were used. 2 Controls for health insurance
comprehension. 3 Controls for health insurance comprehension and choice consistency. 4
Indirect effects were calculated by subtracting the unexponentiated coefficient of interest in the
model controlling for the mediator from the same coefficient in the model without the mediator.
Standard errors and percentile method confidence intervals for indirect effects were obtained by
bootstrapping using 10,000 replicates. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Table 3 Correlates of Choice Consistency1
Count Ratio
(SE)
Regressors of interest

Health insurance
comprehension
9 plan condition
Numeracy

Covariates

Patient activation
Missing patient activation
Health risk
Financial investment
Financial risk
Time discounting
Age
Male
NHAA
Other race
Some college
College or more
Employed
FPL
Rural
Fair or poor health
Any chronic disease
High utilization
Constant
33

-0.93**
(0.03)
1.01
(0.03)
1.00
(0.01)
1.15**
(0.07)
1.05*
(0.03)
0.97
(0.01)
0.98
(0.03)
0.99
(0.02)
1.00
(0.01)
0.90*
(0.05)
1.10
(0.09)
1.11
(0.10)
0.93
(0.06)
0.81***
(0.06)
0.89**
(0.05)
0.96
(0.06)
0.91
(0.09)
0.81***
(0.06)
1.08
(0.07)
1.07
(0.09)
1.31

Count Ratio2
(SE)
1.13***
(0.03)
1.00
(0.04)
0.99
(0.02)
1.00
(0.01)
1.13*
(0.07)
1.04
(0.03)
0.97
(0.02)
0.99
(0.03)
0.98
(0.02)
1.00
(0.01)
0.91
(0.05)
1.15
(0.09)
1.13
(0.10)
0.92
(0.05)
0.82***
(0.06)
0.89**
(0.04)
0.97
(0.06)
0.95
(0.09)
0.81**
(0.06)
1.08
(0.06)
1.09
(0.08)
1.03

3

Indirect effects
(mediation)
Observations
Number of individuals

(0.37)
--

9 plans

848
437

(0.28)
1.08***
(0.02)
848
437

1Correlates of choice consistency modeled using GEE assuming a Poisson distribution for the
outcome. Robust standard errors were used. 2 Controls for health insurance comprehension. 3
Indirect effects were calculated by subtracting the coefficient of interest in the model controlling
for the mediator from the same unexponentiated coefficient in the model without the mediator.
Standard errors and percentile method confidence intervals for indirect effects were obtained by
bootstrapping using 10,000 replicates.*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Table 4 Correlates of Health Insurance Comprehension1

Regressors of interest

9 plan condition
Numeracy

Covariates

Patient activation
Missing patient activation
Health risk
Financial investment
Financial risk
Time discounting
Age
Male
NHAA
Other race
Some college
College or more
Employed
FPL
Rural
Fair or poor health
Any chronic disease
High utilization
Constant

Observations
35

Count Ratio
(SE)
0.79***
(0.02)
1.09***
(0.02)
1.00
(0.01)
1.06
(0.04)
1.03*
(0.02)
1.02*
(0.01)
0.96**
(0.01)
1.02*
(0.01)
1.00**
(0.01)
0.97
(0.04)
0.84***
(0.05)
0.97
(0.04)
1.01
(0.04)
0.94
(0.04)
1.00
(0.03)
0.98
(0.04)
0.86**
(0.05)
1.01
(0.04)
1.01
(0.04)
0.93
(0.05)
1.94***
(0.34)
852

Number of individuals

437

1Correlates of health insurance comprehension were modeled using generalized estimating
equations (GEE) assuming a Poisson distribution for the outcome. Robust standard errors were
used.*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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